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(Pavel Felgenhauer lives in Moscow, is an expert on Russian military affairs, columnist 
for Novaya gazeta, and a frequent contributor to ISCIP’s Perspective.)
Russia defeated neighboring Georgia in August 2008, but this short war revealed 
serious deficiencies in the arming, training, and battle-readiness of our military. During a 
special meeting in the Kremlin on military development a month after the fighting ended, 
President Dmitri Medvedev announced that new weapons will be procured and 
developed and soldiers' pay and battle-readiness increased: "We need modern, 
effective armed forces... This is the highest state priority in the coming years." (1)
Top military commanders echoed the president. A concept of the development of the 
Russian armed forces that reflects new military threats will be produced, announced our 
top military commander, the Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov. (2) 
The army chief General Vladimir Boldyrev, who directly commanded the joint forces that 
invaded Georgia from headquarters in Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia, announced that 
the fighting revealed two main deficiencies: bad communications and command 
systems. (3)
A radical military reform plan was approved during a meeting in September and signed 
as an executive order by Medvedev on September 15, 2008, but kept secret (in the 
Russian tradition) a month longer until October 15, when, after a meeting of Russia's 
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top brass, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov disclosed some details: "Our army is 
today like an egg—swollen in the middle—we have more colonels and lieutenant-
colonels than junior officers," announced Serdyukov. As announced,the number of 
officers in the armed forces will be reduced from 355,000 to 150,000. The number of 
army units would be cut drastically from 1890 to 172 by 2012. The number of disbanded 
units in the other services will not be as drastic: In the Air Force from 340 to 180; in the 
Navy from 240 to 123; in the Strategic Rocket Forces from 12 to 8; in the Space Troops 
from 7 to 6 and in the Airborne from 6 to 5. (4)
Serdyukov announced that divisions and regiments in the Russian army would be 
transformed into more compact brigades, as in Western armies. Military education will 
be radically reformed; the present 65 military academies will be transformed into 10 
military academies and universities. "Russian military education will be transformed to 
match the more effective American model," announced Defense Ministry civilian adviser 
Vitali Shlikov. (5)
Makarov reported, "Less than 20 percent of our units are battle-ready, while the rest 
have only officers without privates." According to Makarov, after the collapse of 
Communism the Russian military was slowly cut in size: "A division had 13,000 men, 
then 10,000, then 5,000, then 2,000, now - 1,500." (6) Commanding officers have no 
experience in leading men and cannot command effectively on the battlefield in time of 
war. According to Makarov, during the war with Georgia, "We were forced to handpick 
colonels and generals from all-over Russia, able to command in battle, because the 
commanders of the 'paper divisions,' when they were given reinforcements of men and 
armaments could not - they were confused and some refused to obey orders." (7)
The thrust of the present reform is to replace, as soon as possible, these worthless 
“paper” or “cadre” units with an armed force of full-blooded, battle-ready units. In 
essence, this is a decisive transformation from a Cold War armed force, designed to 
fight the West in a global war after a mass mobilization of millions of reservists into a 
compact standing army, primarily designed for local and regional conflicts. The war with 
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Georgia in August 2008 may have speeded up the reform, but important groundwork 
was done beforehand. In June 2008, Serdyukov first announced plans to cut the 
number of servicemen in the armed forces from the present 1,130,000 to 1 million by 
2013, to increase pay and to change the "previously approved concept" of the 
development of our military. (8) In another sign of imminent changes, Serdyukov's First 
Deputy, General Aleksander Kolmakov, the former commander of the Airborne Troops, 
told journalists in June 2008 that the Russian military "had stopped developing," and 
that "the training and equipment of our armed forces is on the level of the 1960s and 
1970s." Kolmakov emphasized the importance of having exercises with Western 
militaries to better understand modern military procedures. (9)
By the fall of 2008 Serdyukov had put together a team of generals ready to implement a 
radical military reform: Makarov; Kolmakov; the chief of the Main Directorate of Military 
Training, former Chechen campaign veteran accused by human rights organizations of 
war crimes, General Vladimir Shamanov; Deputy Defense Minister in charge of 
procurement and armaments, former Commander of Russia's Space Forces, General 
Vladimir Popovkin, and others.
Popovkin has been in charge of negotiating the acquisition of a substantial batch of 
different types of Israeli-made spy drones, in what would be the first ever purchase of 
military hardware from the Jewish state and the first official procurement of weapons 
from a Western nation since 1945. The negotiations on the deal are reported to be 
almost complete. (10) Popovkin has been promoting publicly the notion that Russia 
needs Western help and technologies to modernize its military, in complete contrast to 
the old Soviet Cold War doctrine of defense industrial self-sufficiency: "Modern military 
equipment is so complex, we will need foreign know-how, while continuing our own 
military research." (11) Today Shamanov is in charge of disbanding old-time divisions 
and forming new-style brigades.
Radical plans to modernize and westernize our military have met with opposition. The 
planned serious cuts in the number of officers have provoked fear and discontent 
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among the rank and file. High-ranking generals also dislike the planned reform, since it 
demolishes the old Cold War force molded on fighting NATO. They served in such a 
military many years and are against a new, smaller standing army, designed by using 
the Western militaries as a prototype. In a recent interview, former Defense Minister 
(1992-1996) General Pavel Grachev summed up this widespread attitude: "In shaping 
reform plans we must not copy the nations that are preparing to conquer Russia." 
According to Grachev, Russia needs a multimillion armed force to defend itself, and any 
future reform must be modeled on the experience of World War II, as he recalls that in 
the early 1990s he successfully resisted attempts to “Americanize” our military and 
introduce brigades instead of divisions. (12)
In March 2008, the Russian media reported that First Deputy Defense Minister and 
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky, supported by other top 
generals of the General Staff, openly opposed plans for military reform, which were 
proposed by Serdyukov. This "generals' rebellion" reportedly was followed by letters of 
resignation in protest by top generals. (13) The Defense Ministry initially denied the 
existence of a "generals' rebellion" or the possibility of high-ranking resignations. 
Several months later, high-ranking dismissals followed. Baluyevsky was ousted in June 
2008 and shifted to the Security Council - a body that in recent years has been a 
backwater stopover for high-ranking, ousted Russian bureaucrats before final 
retirement. Baluyevsky, 61, was replaced with Makarov, 58, who was handpicked for 
promotion by Serdyukov. In April 2007, Serdyukov appointed Makarov as deputy 
Defense Minister in charge of procurement and armaments. Popovkin took over 
Makarov's position, after the latter was promoted.
The Russian General Staff controls our military machine organizationally and 
operationally. Israel and Turkey have similarly powerful military bodies; other NATO 
member nations do not. The chief of the General Staff controls, in real time, our 
strategic nuclear deterrent and has, together with the President and Defense Minister, 
his own nuclear football. The chief of the General Staff may, in fact, be the only person 
in Russia with the true power to begin nuclear hostilities. Our influential military 
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intelligence organization—the Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU—is part of the 
General Staff.
In July 2008, two key chiefs in the General Staff were discharged as a follow-up to 
Baluyevsky's ouster: The Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff 
General Aleksander Rukshin and the chief of Armed Forces Communications General 
Evgeni Karpov. Rukshin specifically was mentioned in the press as part of the "generals' 
rebellion" against Serdyukov's reform plans. Rukshin was also known as a hard-line 
general, who favored massive additional spending of Russia's newfound oil wealth to 
rebuild our military to face the West. Rukshin publicly supported the continuation of the 
Soviet concept of perimeter defenses, of "creating self-sufficient military groupings on all 
strategic directions," of retaining the Cold War capabilities to mobilize a mass 
multimillion-strong armed force (14).
The Main Operational Directorate or GOU is the core institution of the Russian General 
Staff and is in on-line command of our strategic nuclear deterrent, among other things. 
The Chief of GOU is a three star general's position. After Rukshin's ouster, General 
Valeri Zaparenko took over as provisional chief. In October 2008, a new young general 
was appointed chief of GOU–an army commander with a reputation of having "an iron 
fist." General Sergei Surovkin, 42, a one star general at the time of his promotion, 
commanded the 42nd division permanently based in Chechnya and in 2005 told 
journalists that he would order three Chechen rebels killed in revenge for any of his 
solders slain – "that will be our special account." The Russian press has reported that 
Surovkin has physically assaulted subordinate officers. After the unsuccessful August 
1991 coup Surovkin, a battalion commander in the Tamanskaya motor-rifle division, was 
arrested and spent six months in prison, but later was cleared. Surovkin has a 
reputation for personal valor; he was wounded in fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s, 
also in Chechnya, and has been decorated. It’s reported that 300 senior generals and 
officers of GOU including Zaparenko will be ousted and Surovkin has been appointed to 
do the job. (15)
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GRU is directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and is a separate army 
within the armed forces. The actual personnel strength and organizational structure of 
GRU is a state secret in Russia, but it’s clear that it has many tens of thousands of 
officers and men. GRU agents perform spy operations worldwide, and GRU also 
commands Russian spy satellites. GRU is in command of "special radio 
communications brigades" that intercept foreign electronic communications and GRU 
gathers and analyzes intelligence information to present reports to Russia's political and 
military leaders. The Chief of General Staff approves the reports.
GRU, and through it the General Staff, have their own considerable independent 
combat capabilities – the Special Forces brigades (eight brigades at present) and 
smaller separate Special Forces units. Control of GRU gives the General Staff 
significant institutional capabilities to influence Russian defense, national security, and 
foreign policy decision-making.
Reports have been circulating within the Russian press that GRU is up for serious 
reform. It has been reported that the GRU chief, who is also deputy chief of General 
Staff, four-star General Valentin Korabelnikov, soon will be ousted; GRU is to be cut in 
size and maybe split, with parts moved out of the Defense Ministry and subordinated to 
the Foreign Intelligence Service or SVR – the successor of the former KGB First Main 
Directorate. The Special Operation brigades and units may become subordinate to the 
army. It was reported that Korabelnikov disagreed with these plans and had written a 
letter of resignation. (16)
Makarov officially has denied the reports: Korabelnikov did not write a letter of 
resignation, he is at present enjoying "a prearranged recess" and the Kremlin has 
prolonged the general's duration of active service till he is 65 – the maximum age of 
active military service for top generals. GRU's intelligence assets will not be handed 
over to the SVR and Korabelnikov will himself be in charge of reforming GRU. (17)
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The Korabelnikov narrative mimics in detail the official denials of the "generals' 
rebellion" in the General Staff of a year before: It then also was officially announced that 
there were no letters of resignation, that Baluyevsky had taken a recess and that his 
duration of active service had been extended by the Kremlin. Indeed, today Baluyevsky 
continues to be in active service – in his position as deputy secretary of the Security 
Council.
Vitali Shlykov—an informed Defense Ministry insider and former GRU colonel, who is at 
present a committee chairman and member of the presidium of the Defense Ministry 
Public Chamber, an officially appointed consultative body—believes that GRU will be 
reformed drastically and cut in size. According to Shlykov, the narrative of GRU being 
made subordinate to the SVR is indeed nonsense, but the Special Operation units may 
be removed, while Korabelnikov eventually will be dismissed. Shlykov states that today, 
Russia's top brass, at least outwardly, is totally loyal to Serdyukov, and that "fateful" 
Makarov will not allow the General Staff to sabotage the radical reform plan. According 
to Shlykov, it is of paramount importance that GRU not only be cut in size, but 
eventually be removed from the General Staff completely and subordinated to a civilian 
Defense Minister. This will prevent the General Staff top brass from doctoring 
intelligence reports and manipulating Russia's defense and foreign policy decision-
making.
The personnel of the Defense Ministry's General Staff, central staffs, and command 
structures will be cut from 21,813 to 8,500 by 2012. The announced cuts are causing 
"outrage" within the military, but the reforms are supported fully by Russia's political 
leaders and will be carried out, regardless. (18) The top brass may show outward 
loyalty, but there is significant discontent within the General Staff and elsewhere. 
Serdyukov and Makarov are disliked and, in turn, do not hide their contempt for the 
opposition. Makarov has stated publicly that the General Staff "has grown huge in size, 
but is not performing its functions," which explains why it will be slashed by 2.5 times. 
(19)
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Recently, there were public protests about plans to merge the 67th Special Forces 
brigade based in a small Siberian town Berdsk with another Special Forces brigade. 
(20) The latest reports indicate that the 67th brigade will be disbanded, despite the 
protests. (21)
Serdyukov's reforms are being performed ad hoc, without a new military doctrine. The 
Security Council has failed to approve a prepared draft of a National Security Strategy 
because of reported serious disagreements. (22) The new military doctrine is scheduled 
to come after the Strategy at the end of 2009, but may be postponed, as the Strategy 
debate continues.
Shlykov contends that a new doctrine and Strategy are not essential, since such public 
documents in Russia are used almost exclusively for public relations exercises, while 
Serdyukov's reforms may continue and hopefully change our military irreversibly. Still, 
the absence of any public agreement on what to do and why may bring an abrupt end to 
this reform, as to other previous military reform attempts.
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